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Summary
Labor market concentration can worsen after a merger takes place, and this heightened concentration can
negatively affect wages. The focus of antitrust analysis, however, has been on the prices of consumer products,
not the wages of laborers. New research indicates that, on average, labor markets are highly concentrated, and
that higher concentration is associated with significantly lower posted wages for new jobs. This brief uses
existing economic tools to develop a model for evaluating labor market concentration and its effects, to
determine if a merger will run the risk of anticompetitively suppressing wages, employment, and output.
Regulators can use this model to apply antitrust principles to labor markets, as a basis for antitrust
enforcement.
Disciplines
Antitrust and Trade Regulation | Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Business Law,
Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Economic Policy | Labor Relations
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
This brief is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/53
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
ISSUE BRIEF
VOLUME 6
NUMBER 3
MARCH 2018
The Other Side of a Merger:  
Labor Market Power, Wage 
Suppression, and Finding  
Recourse in Antitrust Law
Ioana Marinescu, PhD
SUMMARY
• Labor market concentration can worsen after a merger takes 
place, and this heightened concentration can negatively affect 
wages. The focus of antitrust analysis, however, has been on 
the prices of consumer products, not the wages of laborers.
• New research indicates that, on average, labor markets are 
highly concentrated, and that higher concentration is associ-
ated with significantly lower posted wages for new jobs. On 
average, a 10% increase in concentration yields is associated 
with a 0.3% to 1.3% decrease in wages. This should have 
implications for how regulators think about mergers.
• As with conventional merger analysis, antitrust regulators could 
screen for mergers that threaten to increase concentration in 
the labor market, and could use calculations of labor market 
concentration to determine when any given merger would likely 
lead to anticompetitive wage suppression.
• It is not a significant stretch of antitrust principles to think of 
consumer welfare as entitling people to a competitive market 
in which to sell their labor, just as it entitles them to a com-
petitive market in which to purchase products and services. 
Most consumers are also workers, and so when it comes to 
protecting consumers, anticompetitive wage effects should 
be given the same attention as anticompetitive price effects.
The enforcement of antitrust law is chiefly motivated by the duty to protect 
consumer welfare—a charge that is understood practically to mean ensuring that 
the prices of consumer products remain competitive after a merger.
The regulatory focus is on evaluating the effects of a 
potential decrease in selling side competition. In terms 
of buying side competition,1 labor market concentra-
tion can worsen after the merger of firms that compete 
for the same pool of workers, regardless of whether 
they compete in the same product market.2 How-
ever, regulators never consider (as a factor in antitrust 
analysis) the impacts on wages from heightened labor 
market power. 
Yet despite this history of price-focused antitrust 
enforcement, we can now hear the early rumblings 
of a largely unstudied idea growing into an urgent 
policy concern.3 This idea is that some mergers may be 
unlawful because they injure competition in the labor 
market by enabling a post-merger firm to suppress 
wages or salaries anticompetitively. Such anticompeti-
tive wage suppression goes hand in hand with the 
suppression of employment and output below the 
competitive level. The economic ripple effects can be 
staggering, and we are only just beginning to under-
stand them.
No court has ever condemned a merger because of 
its anticompetitive effects in labor markets. This may 
be because it has not been clear how widespread labor 
market power truly is, and how much it affects wages. 
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It also may be the result of uncer-
tainty about the mechanisms available 
to courts for litigating antitrust cases 
grounded in concern over concen-
trated labor market power. This Issue 
Brief will highlight the findings of 
several new research papers, which 
collectively provide compelling (albeit 
early stage) answers to each of these 
critical uncertainties.4
In a nutshell, the research indi-
cates that labor market concentration 
in the average market (defined below) 
is high, and higher concentration is 
associated with significantly lower 
posted wages for new jobs. Given 
high concentration, some mergers 
have the potential to significantly 
increase labor market power. Increas-
ing labor market concentration has 
likely contributed to one widely 
observed phenomenon – specifically, 
that the share of labor participation 
in American Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) has fallen substantially (see 
Figure 1).5 Indeed, the markets in 
which firms purchase labor are often 
significantly more concentrated  
than the markets in which they sell 
their products. 
With this knowledge in hand, 
antitrust regulators can use the U.S. 
government’s existing Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines6 to make a prima 
facie case against a horizontal merger 
of firms that, if allowed, could lead 
to anticompetitive wage suppression. 
Under the consumer welfare principle, 
antitrust law is properly directed at 
output reducing practices no mat-
ter what their source, and there is 
certainly no principled reason for 
excluding anticompetitive effects in 
labor markets. 
A LOCAL PROBLEM, 
EVERYWHERE: WAGES FALL 
WHEN LABOR MARKET 
CONCENTRATION RISES
The term “monopsony” commonly 
refers to situations where a few com-
panies dominate hiring in the labor 
market.7 Compared to a perfectly 
competitive labor market, monopsony 
leads to lower employment and lower 
wages. All else remaining equal, lower 
employment also entails lower pro-
duction on the output (product) side. 
 1  E.g., a post-merger firm may have increased market power 
over its suppliers or workers. Buy-side merger challenges 
are uncommon, and historically they have focused on anti-
competitive power over suppliers.
 2  To be clear, the term labor market concentration refers to 
the concentration that exists among the firms who hire and 
employ labor, not to the concentration among the laborers 
themselves. For example, two technology companies in a 
given labor market can compete over the same computer 
engineers and scientists, even if they sell vastly different 
products.
 3  Council of Economic Advisers, “Labor Market Monopsony: 
Trends, Consequences, and Policy Responses,” Issue Brief, 
White House, Washington DC, 2016. (CEA)
 4  This Issue Brief is based primarily on the following 
two papers: Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall 
Steinbaum,“Labor Market Concentration,” Working Paper, 
2017; and  Ioana Marinescu and Herbert Hovenkamp, “An-
ticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets,” Working Paper, 
2018. I also briefly draw on Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, 
Marshall Steinbaum, and Bledi Taska, “Concentration in 
US Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data,” 
Working Paper, 2018.
 5  See, e.g., David Autor, et al., “Concentrating on the Fall of 
the Labor Share,” American Economic Review 107 (2017): 
CEA, supra note 2. The data given here indicate that the 
labor share of nonfarm income fell from 65% in 1948 to 
58% in 2016. 
 6  See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Com-
mission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
merger- review/100819hmg.pdf.
 7  The term “monopsony” is used today in labor economics 
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Ultimately, imperfect competition in 
the labor market has the same kind 
of depressing effect on production as 
we see in cases of imperfect competi-
tion in the product market. For the 
purpose of a merger review in labor 
markets, the most important ques-
tion is whether a merger is likely to 
increase monopsony in a labor market, 
thus reducing wages and output. 
Answering that question requires 
no new tools or methods. We can 
measure labor market concentration 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), which is what regula-
tors already use for product mar-
kets.8 HHI is equal to the sum of 
the squares of the market shares of 
each firm in the market. In this case, 
market shares are based on the share 
of job vacancies of all the firms that 
post vacancies in that market. HHI 
has become conventional in industry 
concentration measures and has been 
used in the government’s Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines for some thirty-
five years.9 The same HHI thresholds 
apply to both seller and buyer power. 
For example, an HHI above 1,500 is 
“moderately concentrated,” an HHI 
above 2,500 is “highly concentrated,” 
and a merger that increases the HHI 
by more than 200 points, leading 
to a highly concentrated market, is 
“presumed likely to increase market 
power.” 
To calculate market shares in 
geographic and occupational labor 
markets, we use data from Career-
Builder.com, the largest online job 
board in the United States, matching 
millions of workers and firms. The 
total number of vacancies on Career-
Builder.com represented 35% of the 
total number of vacancies in the U.S. 
in January 2011 as counted in the 
Job Openings and Labor Turnover 
Survey.10 The occupations we cover 
include the most frequent occupations 
among CareerBuilder.com vacancies, 
plus the top occupations in manufac-
turing and construction. We calculate 
each firm’s vacancy shares—in order 
to determine the HHIs of market 
to refer to both a monopsony proper (i.e., where just one 
buyer dominates the market) and to general demand-side 
lack of competition, or an oligopsony (i.e., where the num-
ber of purchasers of labor is small, but greater than one). 
 8  On use of the HHI in merger assessment, see Phillip E. 
Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶940-932 
(4th ed., 2014).
 9  The first version of the Merger Guidelines to employ the 
HHI was issued in 1982. All versions are maintained by 
the federal antitrust enforcement agencies in an archival 
website. See https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-
merger-guidelines. 
 10  Our results, while fairly general, do not necessarily apply 
to the whole US labor market. CareerBuilder.com does not 
contain all vacancies in the occupations that are in our 
sample. This could lead us to overestimate labor market 
concentration.
 11  An SOC-6 level occupation is a reference to a list of 
“Standard Occupational Classifications” maintained by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupations are assigned 
a six-digit code, and the sixth digit is the highest level 
of classification. See United States Department of Labor, 
Occupational Employment Statistics (2016), available at 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm. 
 12  The commuting zones in question were developed by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture and are based on data from 
the 2000 Census.
 13  See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Commuting Zones and Labor 
Market Areas (2012), available at https://www.ers.usda.
gov/data-products/commuting-zones-and-labor-market-
areas/. 
 14  Ioana Marinescu and Roland Rathelot, “Mismatch Unem-
ployment and the Geography of Job Search,” American 
NOTES 
FIGURE 2 AVERAGE HHI BY COMMUTING ZONE, BASED ON VACANCY SHARES
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This figure shows the average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by 6-digit SOC occupation code for the labor markets over the period of 
2010Q1-2013Q4. The categories we use for the HHI concentration levels are: Low: HHI between 0 and 1500; Moderate: HHI between 1500 
and 2500; High: HHI between 2500 and 5000; Very High: HHI between 5000 and 10000. These categories correspond to the DOJ/FTC 
guidelines, except that we add the additional distinction between high and very high concentration levels around the 5,000 HHI threshold. 
Market shares are defined as the sum of vacancies posted in CareerBuilder.com by a given firm in a given market and year-quarter divided by 
total vacancies posted in the website in that market and year-quarter.
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concentration—for over 8,000 labor 
markets, defined by a combination of 
occupation at the SOC-6 level11 and 
commuting zone.12 
We show that, on average, labor 
markets are highly concentrated: the 
average HHI is 3,157, which is above 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ 
“highly concentrated” threshold 
of 2,500. Concentration varies by 
occupation and city, with larger cit-
ies being less concentrated. Figure 2 
shows a map of all the commuting 
zones in the United States color-
coded by the average HHI, based on 
vacancy shares. Figure 3 shows the 
average HHI by occupation, based on 
vacancy shares. With an average HHI 
of around 2,000, the occupation that 
is least concentrated is “Customer 
service representative.” The most 
concentrated occupation is “Farm 
equipment mechanic,” with an average 
HHI well above 8,000. CareerBuilder, 
while being one of the largest online 
job boards, does not contain all online 
vacancies. Using a dataset from Burn-
ing Glass Technologies that covers 
essentially all online vacancies, we find 
similar results. Across essentially all 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forthcoming. 
 15  Ioana Marinescu and Ronald Wolthoff, “Opening the Black 
Box of the Matching Function: The Power of Words,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
#22508, 2016, available at https://doi.org/10.3386/
w22508. 
 16  See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Unemployed Persons 
by Duration of Unemployment,” available at https://www.
bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 
2018). 
 17  Alan B. Krueger and Eric A. Posner, “A Proposal for Protect-
ing Low-Income Workers from Monopsony and Collusion,” 
2018 (On file with author). 
 18  California v. eBay, Inc., 2014 WL 4273888 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 
29, 2014). 
 19  See DOJ, 2007. “United States v. Arizona Hospital and 
Healthcare Association.” Complaint. See also DOJ, 2010. 
“United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc. et al.” Complaint.  
NOTES 
0
Customer service representative
Sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing, technical and scientific products
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First-line supervisors/managers of production and operating workers
Computer support specialists
Industrial engineers
Executive secretaries and administrative assistants
Truck drivers, heavy and tractor-trailer
Accountants and auditors
Personal financial advisors
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FIGURE 3    AVERAGE HHI BY OCCUPATION, BASED ON VACANCY SHARES, FOR THE LARGEST 30 OCCUPATIONS 
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occupations and commuting zones, 
the average market has an HHI of 
3,953, or the equivalent of 2.5 recruit-
ing employers. In all, 54% of labor 
markets are highly concentrated 
(above 2,500 HHI) according to the 
DOJ/FTC guidelines. Using the 
HHI, we can determine the relation-
ship between concentration and the 
wages that companies advertise in 
their job postings on CareerBuilder.
com. It shows that average posted 
wages are strongly and negatively 
correlated with labor market concen-
tration as measured by HHI. How-
ever, this correlation alone cannot be 
counted as strong evidence that higher 
concentration depresses wages in a 
causal sense, as wages in depressed 
labor markets also tend to be lower.
Instead of simply comparing dif-
ferent labor markets, we look at how 
changes in concentration within a 
given market over time affect wages. 
The data indicate that when labor 
market concentration increases, 
posted wages decrease. Furthermore, 
to account for economic conditions 
in each specific market, we must 
control for the number of job post-
ings divided by the number of job 
applications, also called “labor market 
tightness” in economic jargon. But 
even after controlling for tightness, 
the impact of labor market concentra-
tion on wages remains negative and 
statistically significant. All of these 
tests show that the negative effect of 
concentration on wages is likely to be 
causal and not driven by unaccount-
able market conditions.
The size of the impact of labor 
market concentration on posted wages 
depends on the specific statistical 
model used, but on average, a 10% 
increase in concentration is associ-
ated with a 0.3% to 1.3% decrease 
in wages. Furthermore, smaller cities 
are doubly disadvantaged by having 
higher levels of labor market concen-
tration and by suffering more from 
any increase in concentration.
The takeaway for antitrust regu-
lators is that it is straightforward, 
according to the evidence, to calcu-
late labor market concentration with 
vacancy data.
ANTITRUST LAW CAN 
LEVEL THE PLAYING 
FIELD: DEFINING “LABOR 
MARKETS”
How, then, can regulators use this 
ability to assess labor market power 
when evaluating mergers to determine 
whether any given merger would lead 
to anticompetitive wage suppression? 
The first obstacle in their path is the 
challenge of determining a robust def-
inition of a labor market. Based on our 
research, we suggest this provisional 
definition: commuting zone by 6-digit 
Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC) by quarter. This would be, for 
example, accountants and auditors in 
the Philadelphia commuting zone in 
the first quarter of 2011. The justifica-
tions for each element of this defini-
tion are as follows:
Geography: Markets for many 
non-perishable manufactured products 
are nationwide or even worldwide, 
while service markets tend to be a bit 
smaller. Measuring geographic mar-
kets for labor, however, can be more 
complex. We recommend using the 
observed Commuting Zones (CZs) 
developed by the USDA, as noted 
above. The CZs are based on data from 
the 2000 Census on commuting pat-
terns across counties to capture local 
economies and local labor markets in a 
way that is more economically mean-
ingful than county boundaries.13 On 
CareerBuilder.com, 81% of job appli-
cations occur where the job applicant 
and prospective employer are within 
the same commuting zone.14
Occupation: The 6-digit SOC 
codes can assist in defining markets 
by occupational category. Surprisingly, 
within a 6-digit SOC occupation, job 
postings with higher wages attract 
significantly fewer applicants than 
jobs with lower wages.15 This nega-
tive relationship between wages and 
the number of applicants prevails on 
average across all 6-digit SOC codes 
and is driven by the fact that work-
ers within a 6-digit SOC code can 
be very different from each other. 
For example, among accountants and 
auditors, which is a 6-digit SOC code, 
job postings with the title “senior 
accountant” pay higher wages and 
attract fewer applicants than job post-
ings with the title “junior accountant.” 
This shows that, in general, a 6-digit 
SOC is likely too broad a definition 
of the labor market. However, because 
it may underestimate effective labor 
market concentration, a 6-digit SOC 
is still a good presumptive definition 
of a labor market.
Time: The selection of the time 
period is particularly important for 
the labor market because job seek-
ers can only afford to be unemployed 
and looking for a job for a limited 
period of time. The median duration 
of unemployment is about 10 weeks.16 
That is, unemployed job seekers 
typically are hired or drop out of the 
market within about one quarter. This 
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is why it is presumptively sensible to 
calculate labor market concentration 
over a quarter.
Regulators can thus compute the 
HHI for the labor market based on 
vacancy shares in the commuting 
zone, 6-digit SOC, and quarter, using 
data from Burning Glass Technologies 
(http://burningglass.com/), EMSI 
(http://www.economicmodeling.com/) 
or  Indeed (https://www.indeed.com/). 
Regulators can then use the thresh-
olds from the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines to make a prima facie case 
against a merger that significantly 
increases labor market concentration 
and runs the risk of anticompetitively 
suppressing wages or salaries.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A 
“HORIZONTAL” LABOR 
MARKET MERGER? 
The next obstacle involves deciding 
which mergers are truly “horizontal.” 
Under conventional merger analysis, 
a merger is horizontal if the merging 
firms are competitors in some relevant 
product and geographic market. The 
same principle applies to mergers 
that threaten to increase concentra-
tion in the labor market. Such a 
merger is horizontal if the two firms 
compete for hiring in the same labor 
market, whether or not they compete 
for hiring in the product market. A 
prima facie case against a merger that 
significantly increases labor market 
concentration can be made based on 
HHI, independently of whether the 
merger would also increase concentra-
tion in the product market. 
One useful way to think of the 
extent of horizontal competition in 
the market for employees is to look 
at the participants in the relatively 
large number of “anti-poaching” cases. 
Non-poaching agreements are simply 
collusion by another name. They occur 
when employers agree with each other 
not to hire one another’s workers.17 
The fact that two companies have 
entered into a non-poaching agree-
ment is alone sufficient to suggest that 
the employees subject to that agree-
ment constitute a relevant market 
and that a merger between the firms 
would be anticompetitive. 
To illustrate the difference 
between collusive groups that involve 
products and those that involve labor, 
consider eBay, Inc., and Intuit, Inc.18 
A federal district court approved 
an antitrust settlement in a state’s 
federal antitrust challenge to a labor 
“non-poaching” agreement between 
these firms. Intuit’s principal products 
are TurboTax, a popular income tax 
preparation program, and Quick-
books, a popular business program 
for bookkeeping and accounting. By 
contrast, eBay is a popular online auc-
tion site, which is not in the business 
of producing and selling software. 
Looking at the product side, a merger 
between eBay and Intuit would very 
likely be quickly approved. The firms 
appear not to be substantial competi-
tors in any market in which they sell 
products or services. Nevertheless, the 
two firms found it profitable to agree 
with one another not to poach each 
other’s “specialized computer engi-
neers and scientists.” 
The fact that the two firms found 
it profitable to enter into this agree-
ment is a strong indicator that (1) 
the firms were competitors in this 
particular portion of the labor mar-
ket and (2) that between the two of 
them they had enough market power 
to make the agreement profitable. As 
a result, a merger between eBay and 
Intuit should invite very close scrutiny 
in this particular section of the labor 
market, as should similar cases.19
A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF 
“CONSUMER WELFARE” 
The final obstacle for consideration 
here concerns the future aim of the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. While 
challenges to mergers affecting the 
labor market require some rethinking 
of merger policy, they need not alter 
any of its fundamentals. 
One way to address the case where 
monopsony does not affect product 
prices is to define the “consumer 
welfare” principle in such a way as to 
include both monopoly and mon-
opsony. To do this, we need to think 
about consumer welfare in terms of 
output rather than price. Further, peo-
ple appear in markets as both prod-
uct consumers and as sellers of their 
labor. As a result, it is not a significant 
stretch to think of consumer welfare 
as entitling them to a competitive 
market in which to sell their labor, just 
as it entitles them to a competitive 
market in which to purchase products 
and services. 
Most consumers are also workers, 
and so anticompetitive wage effects 
should be given the same attention as 
anticompetitive price effects. Going 
forward, those reviewing mergers 
cannot simply assume that lack of 
anti-competitive effects in the prod-
uct market entails the same for the 
labor market. 
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CONCLUSION
In this Issue Brief, we presented 
evidence for monopsony in the US 
labor market, showing that labor 
market concentration is high, and 
increasing concentration is associ-
ated with lower wages.  We dis-
cussed the market definition for 
the labor market and argued that 
HHIs based on US vacancy data 
can be used to make a prima facie 
case against a horizontal merger, 
while relying purely on the exist-
ing Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
We described what constitutes a 
“horizontal” merger in the discus-
sion about the widespread use of 
non-poaching agreements. Finally, 
we noted that merger policy does 
not need to change fundamentally 
in order to review mergers that 
threaten to increase labor market 
concentration and allow for anti-
competitive wage suppression.
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